As China rapidly expands its nuclear arsenal, analysts are closely monitoring the potential implications for the geopolitical landscape of the Korean Peninsula.
China’s efforts to not only increase its stockpile of nuclear warheads but also enhance its delivery systems and storage infrastructure have raised alarms. If China adopts a more aggressive nuclear posture, particularly concerning Taiwan, it could introduce further instability and uncertainty into an already volatile region.
In a recent report titled Review of Trends in China’s Nuclear Power Enhancement and Possible Changes in Nuclear Strategy, Baek Sun Woo, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Strategy, noted, “Since 2020, China has clearly pursued both quantitative expansion and qualitative modernization of its nuclear capabilities.”
Five years ago, China ranked third globally in nuclear warhead possession, trailing only Russia and the United States. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, China had approximately 200 nuclear warheads in the 2010s but is expected to exceed 1,000 by 2030.
China is also significantly advancing the diversification and modernization of its nuclear delivery systems. The country has completed its “nuclear triad,” consisting of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers. Alongside new submarines and stealth strategic bombers, China is expanding underground silos for its ICBMs.
While analysts are divided on the purpose of China’s nuclear enhancements, Baek argues that insufficient evidence suggests a fundamental shift toward a more aggressive nuclear strategy. Rather than reducing the threshold for nuclear use, he suggests that China is primarily focusing on strengthening its “retaliatory capabilities” against the U.S.
China’s long-standing “No First Use” (NFU) policy, which pledges that the country will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, remains intact. Among the world’s nuclear states, China is the only one that has publicly committed to this stance. However, regarding Taiwan—an issue China deems a “core interest”—the application of the NFU policy remains ambiguous. This has fueled speculation that China may adopt a more aggressive nuclear posture in its neighborhood, potentially targeting U.S. allies rather than directly confronting the U.S.
Baek pointed out, “Among U.S. experts on China, there is ongoing debate about whether China might use nuclear weapons in the context of Taiwan. China will likely enhance its nuclear capabilities to deter U.S. allies in the region from supporting U.S. military operations.”
“Establishing a security cooperation framework with nations like Japan and Australia is vital for a coordinated response.”
Experts warn that China’s expanding nuclear arsenal, coupled with a possible shift toward a more aggressive nuclear strategy, could trigger an arms race in the region, making South Korea’s prompt and strategic response crucial.
Baek emphasized the importance of tracking China’s nuclear power developments to detect early signs of a potential shift in strategy. Key indicators could include the formal abandonment of the NFU policy, its omission from official security documents, or a focus on low-yield or tactical nuclear capabilities. To properly assess these indicators, he advocated for enhanced intelligence-sharing with regional allies, including the U.S., Japan, and Australia.
Furthermore, Baek stressed, “To mitigate the impact of China’s nuclear expansion on our national security, South Korea must develop independent countermeasures. Strengthening the Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system is critical.”
He concluded, “Now is the time for South Korea to explore forming a security cooperation framework with nations like Japan and Australia, which are facing similar challenges, to jointly address regional security concerns, including China’s nuclear escalation and the potential reduction of U.S. involvement in the region.”
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