As North Korea sheds blood on the battlefield for Russia, various speculations are emerging regarding the potential rewards North Korea might gain for its participation.
From economic cooperation to cyberspace, Russia has hinted at a comprehensive collaboration with North Korea, strengthening military ties based on their shared perception of threats mainly aimed at the United States.
South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) told the National Assembly’s Intelligence Committee in a closed briefing on Thursday that additional North Korean troop deployments to Russia are possible. The NIS predicted that Russia might provide reciprocal support, such as modernizing North Korea’s conventional weaponry.
While some speculate that Russia could support North Korea with its vulnerable air defense systems and fighter jets, analysts emphasize the importance of monitoring security cooperation aimed at the U.S.
Ham Hyung Pil, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA), suggested at the 2024 North Korea Military Forum that “Russia could lend North Korea facilities to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).” He added, “Russia typically lands its ICBMs in its Kamchatka Peninsula. There’s a plausible scenario where they allow North Korea to conduct similar missile tests.”
If North Korea, with Russia’s assistance, conducts a precise ICBM launch and demonstrates technologies like reentry and multiple warheads, it would undoubtedly draw global attention, including from Washington.
U.S. officials have raised concerns about North Korean ICBMs in recent years, emphasizing the need to enhance missile defense capabilities.
Ham emphasized the need to consider whether the most effective provocation for North Korea to draw the U.S. into negotiations at this stage is indeed a nuclear test. He believes that a precise ICBM launch would create a more significant impact than a nuclear test.
In this context, analysts suggest that North Korea is unlikely to exhaust its nuclear test card for a change in strategy.
Ham noted that while North Korea has secured a safety net through improved relations with Russia, its ties with China remain strained. He stated, “North Korea needs to gain more benefits from a nuclear test than the costs involved, but it seems there are not many significant benefits. The likelihood of increased costs appears higher.”
For instance, China is reportedly unhappy with North Korea’s nuclear tests, which could justify stronger trilateral cooperation between South Korea, the U.S., and Japan. Given this, North Korea is unlikely to use its nuclear test option lightly, opting instead to pursue more significant gains through its pendulum diplomacy with China and Russia.
Ham stated, “While it is politically and strategically possible to conduct a nuclear test, North Korea will likely avoid making the mistake of narrowing its strategic options by bringing out the nuclear test card in the current situation.”
Some speculate that North Korea might repeat its traditional pattern of ICBM launches, nuclear tests, and subsequent negotiations. However, analysts argue that technical requirements are the key driver. Strategic provocations are likely more about validating technology than paving the way for talks.
Kim Bo Mi, a researcher at the Institute for National Security Strategy, remarked, “It might be time to let go of the idea that negotiations will resume after North Korea conducts a nuclear test.” She added, “North Korea has already conducted six nuclear tests. In March this year, the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea sanctions was terminated due to opposition from Russia. North Korea may already perceive itself as having achieved semi-official nuclear weapons state status.”
She concluded, “North Korea is likely to carry out nuclear tests purely based on its technical needs.”
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