North Korea’s Cruise Missiles vs. U.S. Tomahawk: Game-Changer in the Region? – Part 3

“The performance is overwhelming when flying radar-altitude”

It is worth noting that the U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile, which is a representative of cruise missiles, and the Hyunmoo-3 cruise missile operated by the South Korean military can fly 30 to 100 meters above the ground and follow the terrain. North Korea’s “Hwasal” long-range cruise missile has also been shown in videos to be capable of flying at similar or lower altitudes.

When North Korean cruise missiles hug the terrain to maintain low flight paths, detecting them with ground-based radar becomes a formidable challenge. Military analysts widely agree that should North Korean submarines breach the East Sea undetected and launch an unexpected assault in waters close to South Korea, the situation would be dire.

This analysis presumes the guidance system of North Korea’s “Hwasal” missile mirrors, to some extent, that of the U.S. Tomahawk’s, though not precisely. Kim Min Seok, a researcher at the Korea Defense and Security Forum (KODEF), has noted that North Korea’s long-range cruise missiles likely possess sophisticated terrain-following abilities, thanks to their use of both American commercial GPS and Russia’s GLONASS system, along with radio altimeters. He underscores the critical need for South Korea to enhance its capabilities for detecting and intercepting these long-range threats from North Korea.

However, cruise missiles become much more vulnerable without the ability to fly at ultra-low altitudes similar to those achieved by the Tomahawk. These missiles move slowly and can be spotted visually. Once spotted, they are easy targets for infantry with portable ground-to-air missiles, not to mention old-type manual anti-aircraft guns or machine guns that are aimed simply by sight.

Given these vulnerabilities, one might wonder why North Korea would prioritize cruise missile development over ballistic missiles, which can reach high speeds and are much harder to intercept. The reason becomes clearer when considering their specific threat to South Korea. Despite the potential for cruise missiles to be less effective against nations like Japan or the U.S. Navy, which possess sophisticated early warning and high-performance anti-air weapons, they are deemed significantly dangerous to South Korea due to loopholes in its air defense capabilities.

Furthermore, considering the launch platforms, flight distances, and trajectories of North Korea’s recent cruise missile tests, it’s a concern that they could target vital national facilities and major military bases in South Korea, evading detection and interception by South Korean forces. Additionally, with the introduction of the “Bulhwasal-3-31,” North Korea has hinted at the capability of these cruise missiles to carry tactical nuclear warheads, as publicly disclosed. This potential makes North Korea’s cruise missile program a grave threat to South Korea’s security.

“Deploying radar planes in the stratosphere for detection”

The Korean military seeks to acquire more early warning systems to bolster its detection capabilities. These airborne early warning systems are designed to spot low-flying North Korean cruise missiles. In response to this threat, the Air Force is currently operating four E-737 “Peace Eye” early warning aircraft and is adding two more to its fleet. However, the development of what can be considered North Korea’s version of the Tomahawk missile has intensified the urgency for additional early warning capabilities, leading to plans to increase the number of new aircraft to four.

There’s also discussion around deploying stratospheric radar-equipped aircraft for enhanced detection. The F-35 stealth fighters, equipped with advanced phased-array (AESA) radar, and the Korea-developed KF-21 fighters are recognized as viable options for intercepting such threats. Moreover, the Army is exploring the adaptation of the “K-SAAM,” a Korean interception missile, for naval use as a countermeasure against cruise missile attacks.

To read Part 1…
To read Part 2…