In a surprising political shift, Donald Trump’s decisive victory in the 2024 presidential election—and the GOP’s sweep of both congressional chambers—signals a strong return of “Trumpism” to American politics. All eyes now turn to the possibility of renewed U.S.-North Korea diplomacy for the Korean Peninsula. Trump repeatedly touted his relationship with Kim Jong Un as a campaign strength and pledged to re-engage diplomatically.
At the Republican National Convention in July, Trump emphasized his rapport with Kim, claiming credit for halting North Korean missile tests and noting that “it’s beneficial to maintain good relations with someone possessing numerous nuclear weapons.” He reiterated his commitment to engage directly with Kim, a hallmark of his 2016 campaign, despite past criticisms that such moves made him appear soft on North Korea. Trump held three historic meetings with Kim during his first term, establishing a foreign policy precedent for direct U.S.-North Korea engagement.
It’s fair to say that Trump’s commitment to resolving issues through U.S.-North Korea summits has become a fundamental foreign policy principle. His close advisors have already indicated plans to pursue summit talks immediately after his inauguration.
Given these factors, it’s likely that Trump will initiate steps toward U.S.-North Korea summit talks early in his term. However, diplomacy requires North Korea’s cooperation—a wildcard, given Kim’s strategic recalibration since 2019. Over recent years, North Korea has pivoted from “Southern diplomacy” with South Korea to strengthen ties with China and Russia, hinting at a shift toward a “Northern diplomacy” alliance. Pyongyang is also pressuring Beijing to accept its nuclear status, a stance that has strained North Korea-China relations.
Leveraging these relationships, North Korea appears to be pressuring China to recognize it as a nuclear power, similar to Russia’s stance. This tension underlies the current chill in North Korea-China relations along the Yalu River border.
In this context, Trump’s return to power could allow the Kim regime to recalibrate its strategic position. If Trump tacitly acknowledges North Korea’s nuclear status, Pyongyang may believe it can cement its position as a nuclear power.
The absence of denuclearization in both major U.S. parties’ platforms, coupled with Trump’s repeated assertions about the benefits of good relations with nuclear-armed leaders, is likely to raise North Korea’s expectations.
Should the Trump administration propose new summit talks, Kim will likely demand the exclusion of denuclearization as a key precondition. While Trump’s response remains uncertain, he might accept this condition in exchange for freezing North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, such as limiting intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). This could elevate arms control as a central issue in U.S.-North Korea relations.
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol’s administration may be particularly precarious following Trump’s return. While Yoon has focused on demonizing Kim Jong Un, Trump openly touts his friendship with the North Korean leader. The stark contrast in approaches – with Yoon viewing the Kim regime as a target for regime change and Trump seeing it as a potential partner – creates a significant policy dilemma.
The divergence extends beyond North Korea’s policy. Yoon’s “values alliance” with the U.S., prioritizing joint military exercises and strategic assets, conflicts with Trump’s transactional approach. Trump’s skepticism of U.S. military commitments in the region and his threats of tariffs on South Korean exports could add economic pressures to Seoul’s already export-dependent economy. The two leaders also differ on Ukraine: while Yoon supports Ukraine’s efforts to win the conflict, Trump advocates peace talks.
While U.S.-South Korea policy differences on North Korea are not unprecedented – as seen in the early 2000s between the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations and the George W. Bush administration – the current discord is uniquely severe and reversed. Given Trump’s temperament and his likely loyal staff, it seems improbable that his administration will defer to the Yoon administration’s stance.
As a result, the triangular relationship among the U.S., North Korea, and South Korea could see major shifts. Japan’s own outreach efforts toward North Korea may also find renewed momentum under Trump, potentially complicating South Korea’s efforts to maintain a hardline stance and strengthen trilateral cooperation with the U.S. and Japan.
Given these challenges, Yoon’s administration must take pragmatic steps. It should prioritize stimulating domestic demand through fiscal policy rather than adhering to the outdated mantra of export-led growth. The government should cease supporting counterproductive measures like anti-North Korea leaflet distribution and loudspeaker broadcasts while demanding reciprocal actions from North Korea. This “dual suspension” could help stabilize inter-Korean relations and prepare for Trump’s potential second term. Further, Seoul should reconsider its stance on military support for Ukraine and align with international efforts for ceasefire and peace talks.
These policy adjustments are within the government’s power to implement and are crucial for safeguarding national interests, public welfare, and citizen safety.
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