Goodbye Hard-Line Policies: South Korea’s New Approach to North Korea

Chung Dong-young, nominated as the first unification minister under the Lee Jae Myung administration, has signaled a significant shift towards a conciliatory approach based on dialogue, mutual restraint, and a less aggressive military stance.

Chung’s confirmation hearing on Monday not only provided insight into his personal views on inter-Korean relations but also shed light on the likely direction of Seoul’s North Korea policy under the new liberal government.

Chung outlined a vision that starkly contrasts with the hard-line North Korea policy of the previous conservative Yoon Suk Yeol administration — a change rooted in his rejection of the prior characterization of North Korea.

\”I do not agree,\” Chung stated when directly asked if North Korea should be viewed as South Korea’s \”main enemy.\”

Instead, Chung, who previously served as unification minister from 2004 to 2005 under then-President Roh Moo-hyun, described North Korea as a \”threat.\”

\”I believe it is our government’s responsibility to create conditions that eliminate the need for North Korea to launch any missiles or artillery shells — and that is entirely achievable,\” Chung asserted.

Blaming Yoon for provocations
When questioned about North Korea’s hostile stance towards inter-Korean relations and its designation of South Korea as the \”principal enemy,\” Chung pointed to the hard-line North Korea policy of the conservative Yoon Suk Yeol administration.

\”Everything is mutually reactive. North Korea’s classification of the two states as hostile, in my view, results from both sides adopting hard-line positions,\” Chung explained. \”I see it as North Korea’s response to the South Korean government labeling it as the main enemy and its rhetoric surrounding preemptive strikes.\”

Chung went further, partially attributing North Korea’s provocations in 2010 — specifically the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeongdo, both of which resulted in South Korean casualties — to the hard-line stance of the conservative Lee Myung-bak administration at that time.

\”In my opinion, North Korea’s response changed as the reconciliation and cooperation policy pursued during the decade under Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun underwent a complete reversal,\” Chung stated.

He reiterated that North Korea’s responses stemmed from a \”principle of hard-line meets hard-line — strength for strength.\”

When asked if the hard-line policy of the Lee Myung-bak administration contributed to North Korea’s 2010 attacks, Chung replied, \”Yes, that’s correct.\”

Ditching Yoon’s doctrine
Chung also committed to \”scrapping\” the unification doctrine of former President Yoon, which was unveiled on August 15, 2024, during National Liberation Day. This doctrine, which emphasized \”freedom-based unification,\” prioritized freedom and human rights in North Korea.

\”That has failed,\” Chung argued, contending that it directly contradicts the 1989 National Community Unification Formula, which was based on recognizing and respecting North Korea’s system. \”What does ‘liberation of North Korean residents through freedom’ mean if not absorption or unification through collapse?\”

Chung characterized Yoon’s August 15 unification doctrine as \”born of hostility and hatred.\”

He further emphasized, \”Using North Korean human rights as a weapon against the North Korean regime is inappropriate.\”

\”If, for instance, the Supreme People’s Assembly of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea were to enact a ‘South Korean Human Rights Act’ and start intervening in South Korea’s human rights issues, how would we perceive that?\” Chung asked, referring to North Korea’s rubber-stamp parliament.

\”That would directly violate Article 2 of the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement, which states that both the South and the North shall not interfere in each other’s internal affairs.\”

Fewer drills, more dialogue?
Chung also supported reducing large-scale field training exercises, which U.S. President Donald Trump unilaterally suspended in June 2018 after his first meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un during his first term.

\”The combined exercises aim to mitigate North Korea’s threats and ensure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. In that context, I don’t believe that conducting exercises is the ultimate goal.

\”If adopting a flexible approach to military exercises can help ease tensions and improve inter-Korean relations, then it’s certainly worth discussing.\”

Chung explained that allies could focus on conducting command post exercises using computer simulations without a field training component, as they did during the Moon Jae-in administration from 2017 to 2022.

Regarding regaining wartime operational control from the U.S., Chung stated it was \”a natural step for an independent and sovereign nation,\” but he added that achieving this within the next five years may be unrealistic.

However, Chung affirmed the necessity of the stationing of U.S. Forces Korea when asked about it.

\”The consistent position of successive Democratic Party administrations has been that the presence of U.S. forces in South Korea is essential for the long-term stability and balance of Northeast Asia,\” he said.

On the topic of South Korea’s independent nuclear armament, Chung disagreed. \”It’s unrealistic. How could we possibly acquire nuclear weapons? Would we jeopardize the alliance? How would we convince the U.S.?\”